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MILITARY MOTHERS AND CLAIMS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR INJURIES THAT 
OCCUR PRE-BIRTH 
Tara Willke∗ 
Although she is a servicewoman, a mother cannot be confined to her 
military status.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts treat military mothers and their children differently 
from male military members and their children for claims sought under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for a military doctor’s medical 
malpractice in the treatment and delivery of the child.  For instance, most 
recently, in Ortiz v. United States ex rel. Evans Army Community Hospital, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the FTCA barred the 
husband of a female Air Force officer from bringing a claim against the 
government when his child suffered brain trauma that resulted from a 
negligent delivery.2  The Feres doctrine, a judicially created exception to 
the FTCA, bars members of the military from bringing claims under the 
FTCA if the injury was sustained “incident to service,”3 and thus 
compelled the court to hold that the government was not liable under the 
FTCA in this case.4  This arcane and overly broad doctrine has also been 
 
 © 2016 Tara Willke.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review 
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
 ∗  Tara Willke is an Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of Law and a 
veteran of the United States Air Force.   
 1  Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 207 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., 
concurring). 
 2  786 F.3d 817, 818 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 3  Id. at 820 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). 
 4   Id. at 818. 
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applied to bar third party claims if the injury to the third party derived from 
an injury to the service member. 
The Ortiz court was only compelled to reach this result because the 
child’s mother was in the military.  If the child’s mother had not been a 
member of the military but was a spouse of a military member, the Feres 
doctrine would not have applied.  The Ortiz decision is the most recent in a 
patchwork of decisions that outline the unfairness and inconsistency in the 
application of the Feres doctrine.  A petition for certiorari has been filed, 
but the Court has denied review in earlier cases.5 
In order to right a longstanding wrong perpetrated against military 
mothers and their children, the Court should grant review.  Part I of this 
Essay provides a brief discussion of the FTCA and the Feres doctrine.  Part 
II discusses the facts and holding in Ortiz and its rejection of the 
approaches taken in other circuits involving pregnant service members and 
pre-birth injuries, which has caused a clear split in the circuits.  Part III 
argues that these types of claims are not subject to the Feres doctrine 
because pregnancy and injuries that occur incident thereto do not occur 
“incident to service.” 
I.     THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE FERES DOCTRINE 
While the government is otherwise immune from civil lawsuits under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity,6 in 1946 Congress passed the FTCA,7 
which allows injured parties to recover when the government is at fault.8  
There are certain enumerated exceptions, but none of the exceptions 
unambiguously bars members of the military from bringing a claim under 
the FTCA.9  Only three of those exceptions could be read as pertaining to 
members of the military.  One exception concerns claims “arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, 
during time of war.”10  The other two exceptions that may be read as 
 
 5  See, e.g., Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2135 (2014); Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
975 (1988); Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 
987 (1988); Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1082 (1983).   
 6   See, e.g., Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375–76 (1899) (“It is an axiom of 
our jurisprudence.  The Government is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its 
liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it.” 
(citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894))).  
 7  Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
 8  See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012).  
 9  See id. § 2680.   
 10  Id. § 2680(j).   
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applying to members of the military are those for claims arising in a foreign 
country and for the exercise of a discretionary function.11 
Four years after the FTCA was passed, the Supreme Court decided 
Feres v. United States.12  Feres addressed three cases that were factually 
similar: in each case a member of the military suffered injuries at the hands 
of government employees while on active duty, and two of the three cases 
concerned negligent medical care.13  Even though none of the enumerated 
exceptions in the FTCA was implicated, because the plaintiffs were on 
active duty at the time of the injuries, the Court held the FTCA was not a 
viable remedy “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to service.”14 
Over the years, the Court’s justifications for the doctrine have become 
known as the Feres rationales.15  These rationales have been heavily 
criticized as being irrational and unfair.16  One rationale focuses on the 
relationship between the federal government and members of the military.17  
The theory is that because those in the military are federal employees, 
federal law, and not state tort law, should govern claims brought by these 
federal employees.18  Another rationale focuses on the existing availability 
of benefits for those in the military.19  If members of the military already 
have a system of benefits that provide them with recovery, then there is no 
need for them to bring claims under the FTCA.20  The final rationale 
focuses on military discipline, under the theory that if members of the 
military are allowed to bring claims under the FTCA it will undermine the 
military discipline structure.21  At one point, the Court seemed to 
emphasize and prioritize this rationale over the other two,22 but it 
ultimately reiterated that the doctrine was underpinned by all three of the 
rationales.23 
Other than articulating these three rationales, the Court has not 
provided any other guidance as to when an injury occurs “incident to 
 
 11  See id. § 2680(a), (k).  
 12  340 U.S. 135 (1950).  
 13  See id. at 136–38.  
 14  Id. at 146. 
 15  See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 688–91 (1987) (outlining three 
rationales).   
 16  See, e.g., id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17  See id. at 689 (majority opinion). 
 18  See id.  
 19  See id. at 689–90. 
 20  See id.  
 21  See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).   
 22  See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (citing United States v. 
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)).  
 23  See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 688–91. 
2016] M I L I T A R Y  M O T H E R H O O D  A N D  T H E  F E R E S  D O C T R I N E  163 
service.”  As a result, lower courts have had difficulty in making this 
determination.24  Some have created factor-based tests to aid in the inquiry, 
and others have taken different approaches.25  One court has noted that it 
has “reached the unhappy conclusion that the cases applying the Feres 
doctrine are irreconcilable.”26  Ultimately, in most cases, the Feres doctrine 
has been used to prevent military members from recovering for almost any 
injury caused by government personnel, no matter how tenuously 
connected to the person’s military service. 
Regardless of the criticism the doctrine has received, it has been 
extended to claims brought by third parties when the third party’s claim 
derived from an injury that a member of the military sustained incident to 
service.27  This has become known as the “genesis test.”28  This test has 
taken on a life of its own and has been applied to a number of situations, 
like the claims at issue in Ortiz. 
II.     ORTIZ AND THE PRE-BIRTH INJURY CASES 
A.   Ortiz’s Facts and Holding 
In Ortiz, Captain Heather Ortiz was scheduled for a routine Caesarean 
section at a military hospital.29  In preparation for that procedure, hospital 
staff negligently provided her with a drug to which she was allergic.30  To 
counteract the negative effects of that drug, she was given another, which 
caused her blood pressure to drop, causing hypotension, “an injury that 
occurs when blood flow is inadequate to perfuse the uterus and the 
placenta.”31  As a result, her unborn child experienced “brain trauma that 
caused cerebral palsy.”32 
Ortiz’s husband filed a claim on the child’s behalf under the FTCA.33  
The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the case 
under the Feres doctrine.34  On review, the Tenth Circuit noted that courts 
have looked to different policy reasons and rationales or “special factors” 
 
 24  See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 25  Compare Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining four 
factors), with Purcell v. United States, 656 F.3d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying a single, 
dispositive inquiry).   
 26  Costo, 248 F.3d at 867.   
 27  See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). 
 28  Ortiz v. United States ex rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 824 (10th 
Cir. 2015). 
 29  Id. at 818–19.   
 30  Id. at 819.   
 31  Id.   
 32  Id.   
 33  Id. 
 34  Id.   
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to determine if the doctrine should apply,35 but in the end it held that the 
primary inquiry was “whether the injury was ‘incident to service.’”36  The 
court admitted that the language “incident-to-service” was “neither self-
defining nor readily discernible” from prior Supreme Court precedent.37  
Nevertheless, it found that the test applies broadly and “encompasses, at a 
minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that are even remotely 
related to the individual’s status as a member of the military,” and that 
“[p]ractically any suit that implicates the military’s judgments and 
decisions runs the risk of colliding with Feres.”38 
Because a third party was bringing the claim, the court held the 
genesis test applied.39  It found that in reviewing the pre-birth injury cases, 
some courts used the “treatment-focused” approach, holding that if the 
government’s conduct was focused on the child and not the mother, then 
the Feres doctrine did not apply.40  It rejected this approach in favor of an 
“injury-focused” approach, which “asks first whether there was an 
incident-to-service injury to the service member.”41  If that question is 
answered in the affirmative, then the inquiry focuses on “whether the injury 
to the third party was derivative of that injury.”42  In applying its test, the 
court found that the child’s injuries were caused by the allergic reaction 
and drop in blood pressure experienced by her mother prior to the child’s 
birth, so the Feres doctrine applied.43 
The decision in Ortiz is the most recent example of the difficulty the 
courts have with determining whether the Feres doctrine should apply to 
these types of claims. 
B.   The Pre-Birth Injury Cases 
In the early cases involving injuries sustained by pregnant female 
service members, the service member herself sought recovery.44  The Feres 
doctrine was, however, used to bar the claims brought by those female 
 
 35  See id. at 821–22. 
 36  Id. at 822 (citing Tootle v. USDB Commandant, 390 F.3d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir. 
2004)).   
 37  Id. at 820–21.  
 38  Id. at 821 (quoting Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 
2000) (per curiam)).   
 39  See id. at 824.  
 40  Id. at 828.   
 41  Id. at 825 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950)).  
 42  Id. (citing Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673–74 
(1977)). 
 43  See id. at 831–32.   
 44  See Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 127 (6th Cir. 1988); Del Rio v. United 
States, 833 F.2d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 203 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
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service members.45  The courts failed to provide any discussion as to how 
pregnancy and injuries sustained thereto relate to one’s responsibilities as 
members of the military.46  Regardless, at the end of the 1980s, it was clear 
that a female service member’s claims for injuries she sustained during 
pregnancy would be barred by the Feres doctrine, and women stopped 
seeking claims on their own behalf. 
When addressing claims brought on the behalf of service members’ 
children, courts have used or proposed approaches other than the one used 
by the court in Ortiz.  This has caused a clear circuit split.  Early cases 
applied the rationales outlined in Feres to the child’s claim to determine if 
the claim should be barred and reached inconsistent results applying those 
rationales.47  In the early 1990s, the Fourth Circuit used the “treatment-
focused” approach, which was rejected by the court in Ortiz, to determine 
if the claim should be barred.48  Pursuant to this approach, if the “sole 
purpose” of the treatment that the mother received was for the child’s 
benefit only, the Feres doctrine does not apply.49  Courts are forced to 
engage in this analysis and chose one of these approaches because the 
child’s mother is in the military. 
III.     INJURIES SUSTAINED DURING PREGNANCY DO NOT OCCUR 
“INCIDENT TO SERVICE” 
In the pre-birth injury cases, application of the Feres doctrine hinges 
on the mother’s military status, regardless of whether the claim is brought 
by the female service member or for her child.  Even though the Supreme 
Court has stated that “[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few 
bright-line rules,”50 that is exactly what has happened.  In the pre-birth 
cases, it has been reduced to one bright-line rule: if the woman is in the 
military, her claim is barred, and her child’s may be too, depending on the 
approach used by the court.  The controversy surrounds the meaning of the 
phrase “incident to service.”  In finding that the injury has occurred 
“incident to service,” courts have blindly assumed that injuries sustained 
during pregnancy occur “incident to service,” as that phrase was used in 
Feres.  Even though we cannot be certain regarding the exact driving force 
behind the Court’s holding in Feres, it is possible that the Court only 
 
 45  See Irvin, 845 F.2d at 130; Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 286; Atkinson, 825 F.2d at 206.  
 46  See, e.g., Irvin, 845 F.2d at 130 (relying only on a statement that the service 
member’s “individual claim is barred under a straightforward reading of Feres”). 
 47  Compare Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 973–74 (5th Cir. 1982) (barring 
suit initiated by child under Feres), and Irvin, 845 F.2d at 130–31 (same), with Del Rio, 833 
F.2d at 287–88 (allowing maintenance of claim on child’s behalf).   
 48  See Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 225 (4th Cir. 1992).   
 49  Id. 
 50  United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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intended to bar claims that would have been covered by the typical 
worker’s compensation laws—claims that were, in some way, related to the 
service member’s duties in support of the “military enterprise.”51  A closer 
review of the history of women in the military demonstrates that pregnancy 
was not part of the military enterprise at the time of the Feres decision and 
has never been. 
Prior to World War II, if a nurse serving in the Army Nurse Corps 
became pregnant and was not married, she was dishonorably discharged.52  
The military’s treatment of pregnancy was not altered significantly with the 
passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, which provided 
for the integration of women into the armed forces, but which also provided 
that women could be discharged for reasons that were different from the 
reasons men could be discharged.53  Thus, at the time Feres was decided, 
women were subject to discharge for almost any reason,54 and in 1951, 
with President Truman’s signing of Executive Order 10,240, it was clear 
that pregnancy and duties consistent with motherhood were grounds for 
discharge.55  The policy allowing for the discharge of pregnant women was 
not officially deemed unconstitutional until 1976, long after the Feres 
doctrine was in place.56 
Today, pregnancy has been and continues to be something that is 
treated as outside the realm of regular military service.  If a woman 
becomes pregnant on active duty, she may seek a voluntary separation 
because of the pregnancy.57  Upon confirmation of pregnancy, the military 
may impose restrictions on a pregnant service member’s ability to change 
her duty station during the duration of the pregnancy and for a short time 
thereafter.58  Likewise, pregnant service members may have their regular 
work duties altered during their pregnancy.59  Thus, courts should not 
blindly assume that just because a female service member is pregnant, any 
 
 51  Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995).   
 52  See JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 71 
(rev. ed. 1992). 
 53  Pub. L. No. 80-625, § 104(h), 62 Stat. 356, 359–60 (1948) (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.); see also HOLM, supra note 52, at 124–26 (describing 
unprecedented discharge authority for women but not men who could only be involuntarily 
discharged for “moral dereliction, professional dereliction, or because his retention was not 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security”). 
 54  See HOLM, supra note 52, at 124–26. 
 55  Exec. Order No. 10,240, 3 C.F.R. § 749 (1949–1953). 
 56  See Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).   
 57  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 36-3208, ADMINISTRATIVE 
SEPARATION OF AIRMEN para. 3.17 (2004). 
 58  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 36-2110, ASSIGNMENTS 
para. 2.39 (2009). 
 59  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 10-203, DUTY LIMITING 
CONDITIONS para. 3.5 (2013). 
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injuries she or her child sustains during the pregnancy occur “incident to 
service” when every indication is that the military treats pregnancy as 
something that is outside the realm of ordinary service. 
Furthermore, an application of the Feres doctrine to these types of 
cases reveals the absurdity it causes.60  If a spouse of someone in the 
military becomes pregnant and the spouse is not serving on active duty, any 
injuries she or her unborn child sustains are not barred by the Feres 
doctrine because she is not a member of the military, even though she may 
have had the same military doctor, used the same military facilities as a 
pregnant female service member, and may have suffered the same types of 
injuries.  Put more simply, a male service member whose wife is not in the 
military may bring a claim under the FTCA for damages sustained if his 
wife or their child is injured during the pregnancy, and, likewise, so may 
his wife and child.61 
There is no sound basis to allow men to recover for injuries sustained 
by their pregnant wives just because the wife is not in the military: the 
primary concerns that underlie the application of the Feres doctrine to a 
female service member also exist if a male service member brings suit.  In 
examining the rationales for the doctrine, male members of the military 
have the same “distinctively federal” relationship with the government as 
female members of the military, and a lawsuit brought by a male member 
of the military for injuries sustained by his wife or child during pregnancy 
will involve the same sort of inquiry into military decision-making that the 
courts are trying to avoid, especially if it involves the same doctor, hospital, 
or procedure. 
The only current rationale that could possibly justify the application of 
the doctrine to a female service member and not a male service member is 
the availability of the no-fault compensation scheme provided under the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act.62  It is, however, unclear whether the types of 
damages claimed by the female service women are the type that would be 
covered by that Act.  For instance, women have not always sought damages 
for their own injuries: female service members have sought damages for 
 
 60  “It is true, of course, that statutes are to receive a reasonable construction and that, 
in determining the legislative intent, exceptions are to be read into their language to avoid 
injustice, oppression or absurd consequences.”  United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 850 
(4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, C.J., dissenting) (first citing United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 482, 483 (1868); then citing Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892); 
and then citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446–48 (1932)), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949).  
 61  See Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 1014–16 (D.R.I. 1987) (involving a 
claim under the FTCA brought by a male member of the service, his wife (who was not in 
the service), and their infant daughter, who suffered extreme injuries prior to her birth), aff’d 
in part, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 62  38 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). 
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the costs of taking care of the injured child.63  Without some proof that the 
female service member is seeking the types of damages covered by the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act, that rationale alone should not be used to 
categorically bar her claim.  Thus, as applied to these cases, the Feres 
doctrine raises equal protection issues that could be alleviated if pregnancy 
and injuries incident thereto are finally acknowledged as something that do 
not occur “incident to service.” 
Regarding the child’s claim, if injuries that occur during pregnancy 
are not considered as occurring “incident to service,” then the courts do not 
have to engage in a round of legal gymnastics to determine whether the 
Feres rationales apply to bar the child’s claim, whether the treatment was 
to benefit the mother or the child, or whether the child’s injury had its 
genesis in an injury to the child’s military mother.  In short, the child will 
not be prejudiced from bringing a claim just because the child’s mother is 
in the military. 
CONCLUSION 
Application of the Feres doctrine to claims brought by pregnant 
female service members and their children pre-birth is only triggered if the 
woman is a member of the military; the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ortiz 
highlights the legal wrangling the courts have been forced to engage in 
solely because of this fact.  Even if the Feres doctrine itself stands on solid 
ground, its application in these types of cases does not.  Pregnancy is not 
something that has ever been part of the military enterprise and will occur 
regardless of the military’s mission; as such, any injuries related thereto do 
not occur “incident to service.”  As noted by Judge Nelson in Ritchie v. 
United States, “To hold that these kinds of tortious acts against a pregnant 
servicewoman are per se judicially unreviewable because they are part of 
the military mission is to practice willful blindness at the expense of a 
woman’s livelihood and the life of her unborn child.”64 
 
 
 63  See, e.g., Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 224 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 64  Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nelson, J., concurring). 
